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Act 10: Remedying Problems of
Pennsylvania's Rape Laws or Revisiting
Them?*
I. Introduction
Even if an allegation of rape makes it to the judicial system,
it is more than 50% as likely as a murder prosecution to be
dismissed and 30% more likely to be dismissed than a robbery
prosecution.' A rape victim has only a 2.5% chance of seeing her2
attacker convicted, and a 1.9% chance of seeing him incarcerated.
These statistics demonstrate the need for rape reform in the judicial
system to enable victims to seek justice against their attackers.4
Rape victims who enter the judicial system are faced with a
number of barriers. Unless the rape was a "traditional" rape in
which a stranger emerged from a dark alley, held the victim at
* The author notes that the use of parallel citations to Pennsylvania and New Jersey
reporters is intended to facilitate further research of this topic.
1. Rape Statistics, SUNDAY PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Sept. 24,1995, at B1 (quoting
statistics from U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., THE RESPONSE TO RAPE: DETOURS ON THE
ROAD TO EQUAL JUSTICE (1993)).
2. For the purposes of this Comment, victims are referred to as female and assailants
as male because statistics show that 98.9% of the victims of rape are women. Id. This
phraseology in no way implies that male victims do not experience the same barriers in the
judicial system as females. See Arthur Kaufman, Male Rape Victims: Noninstitutionalized
Assault, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 221, 223 (1980) ("Although little has been written about
the effect of rape on males, it appears, that despite the controlled reactions usually evident,
male victims may experience major, hidden trauma.").
3. Rape Statistics, supra note 1.
4. See Commw. of Pa., S. LEGIS. J., No. 4, Jan. 31, 1995, First Special Session, at 220-
21. Senator Greenleaf issued the following statement on the Senate floor:
[T]he statistics that we have seen over the years indicate that many of these crimes
are not reported, and if they are reported, they are not successfully prosecuted,
and, therefore, many victims in Pennsylvania and many women in Pennsylvania
do not report these offenses and their assailants are not convicted, and, therefore,
are free to pursue other victims in the future because of escaping their just
punishment for their acts.
Id.
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gunpoint and forcibly raped her,' a victim is faced with the notion
that she somehow did not experience a "true rape"6 and may even
be responsible for the rape.7 Moreover, unlike most other crimes
of violence, the judicial system examines the victim's behavior
instead of the actions of the assailant in establishing the underlying
crime of rape.' These barriers in the judicial system explain why
many victims do not feel comfortable taking their claims to the
judicial system and also why, once in the system, rape cases are
difficult to prosecute.
Pennsylvania has attempted to address the needs of rape
victims and reform Pennsylvania's rape law with the passage of Act
10' during the 1995 Special Session on Crime. These modifications
are aimed at making sexual offenses easier to prosecute and
preventing victims from being victimized once again in the
courtroom." This Comment recognizes the changes which Act 10
accomplishes and analyzes whether they are significant enough to
accomplish the reform needed in the Pennsylvania judicial system's
treatment of rape.
Part II of this Comment first examines historical approaches
to rape in Pennsylvania and the inequalities which resulted from
these conceptions. The section then discusses the 1972 revisions
5. According to the 1993 Pennsylvania Crime Report, 3,101 forcible rapes were
reported to police departments in Pennsylvania. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
believes that one person is raped every five minutes in the United States. Id. at 21.
6. See U.S. Annual Rape Statistics Double: There is No Indication of an Actual Increase
in Rapes, It's Just That More Are Being Reported, WINDSOR STAR, Aug. 17, 1995, at A12
(proposing that it is well known among researchers that, if the questioner uses the word
"rape" instead of just physically describing forced sexual intercourse, the number of positive
responses goes down by about 50%).
7. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1092 (1986) (employing the terminology
"traditional rape" and "non-traditional rape," the latter of which Estrich identifies as
scenarios where less force is used, no physical injury is inflicted, threats are inarticulate, the
two parties know each other, the setting is not an alley but a bedroom, the initial contact was
not a kidnapping but a date, and the woman says no but does not fight).
8. Id. at 1124.
9. 1995, Mar. 31. P.L. 985, No. 10 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), § 10, effective in 60 days
[hereinafter Act 10].
10. See House Judiciary Committee Hearing Re: H.B. 160, Sept. 1, 1993. State Rep.
Karen Ritter remarked upon her intent in developing a new rape law:
I am not suggesting that we throw out our whole body of law on sex crimes.
Rather, I am suggesting we base our laws on what is proven, and not what is
mythical.... This bill is intended to see to it that sexual offenders are adequately
punished, and that their victims are not subjected to further victimization by the
criminal justice system.
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which sought to change the rape law to reflect current moral and
ethical conceptions and not outdated traditional stereotypes. Part
III identifies the impetus which prompted Pennsylvania legislators
to reexamine and amend the 1972 revisions, resulting in the passage
of Act 10. Part IV describes the legislative history of Act 10. Part
V discusses the changes the Act accomplishes and recognizes that
Act 10 strengthens Pennsylvania's rape law in some important
respects. Part V also recognizes that by failing to abolish the term
"rape" and failing to explicitly define some key terms of the new
provisions, legislators may have left loopholes in the legislation.
These shortcomings may ultimately mean that Act 10 revisits the
same problems which it seeks to remedy.
II. Pennsylvania's Historical Approach to Rape
Historically, Pennsylvania law regarded a rape complaint with
suspicion. In the nineteenth century, the crime of rape was defined
as "carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.""
Force and absence of consent were essential elements of the crime
of rape at common law. 2 Both of these elements were gauged by
the extent of the victim's resistance to her assailant's attack instead
of the perpetrator's actions. 3 In 1875, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court upheld the following jury instruction:
[11n order to guard against false charges in cases of this kind-it
has been deemed an important test of the sincerity of the
woman, that while the commission of the offense was in
progress, she cried aloud, struggled and complained on the first
opportunity, and prosecuted the offender without delay. 4
Another Pennsylvania court required that a woman must resist to
the utmost unless the actor's threats or behavior put her in "fear of
death or great bodily harm, a fear of great personal injury or
serious personal injury, a fear that so overpowers her that she dares
not resist, a fear and terror so extreme as to preclude resis-
tance.,
15
11. Commw. v. Mlinarich, 518 Pa. 247, 257, 542 A.2d 1335, 1340 (1988) (quoting 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 209 (G. Sharswood ed. 1890)).
12. Id. (quoting Commw. v. Shrodes, 354 Pa. 70, 72, 46 A.2d 483, 484 (1946)).
13. Id.
14. Commw. v. Berkowitz, 415 Pa. Super. 505, 519 n.5, 609 A.2d 1338, 1345 n.5 (1992)
(quoting Stevick v. Cornmw., 78 Pa. 460 (1875)).
15. Mlinarich, 518 Pa. at 257, 542 A.2d at 1340-41 (citations omitted).
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With this historical perspective, many decisions from the
Pennsylvania court system effectively punished the victim for being
raped instead of punishing the assailant for committing the act. For
example, in 1938 the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a rape
conviction where the defendants kidnapped the victim, drove her
to a club, took her to a vacant lot and forced her to have inter-
course against her will.16 The Superior Court held that it was
error for the trial court to fail to charge the jury on the significance
of the absence of complaint and resistance.17
In light of such holdings, an assailant who forced his victim to
engage in sexual intercourse did not commit the crime of rape
unless the force he used on the victim induced a reasonable and
incapacitating fear of harm in the victim."i However, if an
assailant did not use force, rape could still be established by
proving that the victim did not consent, 9 which was proven by the
degree of the victim's resistance.2" Because both force and
consent were established by examining a victim's reaction, the
judicial system did not recognize that the crime of rape had
occurred unless the victim's reaction met societal expectations.
In 1972, Pennsylvania developed a new crimes code which
purported to make the law stronger, more effective and tougher on
crime. 21  Within this formulation, Pennsylvania revised its ap-
proach to rape by attempting to "evaluate the possible variances of
[rape] and realistically [proposing] changes to conform to today's
moral and ethical standards., 22 Under the new code, the legisla-
ture recognized four scenarios where the crime of rape could occur:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages
in sexual intercourse' with another person not his spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
16. Commw. v. Berkowitz, 133 Pa. Super. 190, 2 A.2d 516 (1938).
17. Id.
18. Mlinarich, 518 Pa. at 258, 542 A.2d at 1341.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Sheldon S. Toll, Criminal Law Reform in Pennsylvania: The New Crimes Code,
78 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1973).
22. Id. at 6.
23. The definition section of the code defines "sexual intercourse" as follows: "[i]n
addition to its ordinary meaning, [sexual intercourse] includes intercourse per os or per anus,
with some penetration however slight; emission is not required." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3101 (Supp. 1995).
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(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent
resistance by a person of reasonable resolution;
(3) who is unconscious; or
(4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such
person is incapable of consent.24
The description of these four scenarios expanded the traditional
unlawful "carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her
will" definition of rape.25
In addition to expanding the definition of rape, the legislature
attempted to overcome the traditional approach of analyzing the
reaction of the victim to establish force and consent by drafting a
resistance-not-required provision. This provision explicitly states
that an "alleged victim need not resist the actor in prosecution
under this chapter: Provided, however, That [sic] nothing in this
section shall be construed to prohibit a defendant from introducing
evidence that the alleged victim consented to the conduct in
question., 26  The legislature also abolished the prompt reporting
provision which prohibited prosecution of rapes that had not been
called to the attention of a public authority within three months of
their occurrence. 27  By enacting these provisions, Pennsylvania
statutorily dispelled the traditional myths that the failure to resist
and to report the crime promptly are indications that a rape has
not occurred.
In addition to attempting to overcome common law myths, the
legislature established the crimes of involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse, 28 voluntary deviate sexual intercourse,29 aggravated
24. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995) (amended by Act 10).
25. See supra note 11; infra notes 37, 39.
26. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (West 1983) [hereinafter resistance-not-required
statute].
27. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3105 (amended 1976). The provision which took the
place of the prompt reporting requirement provides as follows:
Prompt reporting to public authority is not required in a prosecution under this
chapter: Provided, however, That [sic] nothing in this section shall be construed
to prohibit a defendant from introducing evidence of the alleged victim's failure
to promptly report the crime if such evidence would be admissible pursuant to the
rules of evidence.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3105 (West 1983). See also Susan N. Williams, Rape Reform
Legislation and Evidentiary Concerns: The Law in Pennsylvania, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 955
(1983) (discussing Pennsylvania's rape shield law, the requirements of prompt complaint and
corroboration, and the use of cautionary instructions).
28. The crimes code provided that a person commits involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse, a felony of the first degree when he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with
another person:
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indecent assault,3" and indecent assault.31 The legislature chose
to separate and distinguish spousal sexual assault32 and statutory
rape33 from Section 3121 rape even though all three crimes
involved the same underlying act.34 The legislature created these
crimes to promote the state's interest in protecting the public from
offensive displays of sexual behavior and in preventing people from
being forced against their will to submit to sexual contact.35
Even though the 1972 revisions were designed to abolish
traditional rape myths, problems resulting from the interpretation
of these revisions arose, enabling many serious sexual offenses to
evade prosection. Such problems pressured legislators to revise
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of
reasonable resolution;
(3) who is unconscious;
(4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapable of
consent; or
(5) who is less than 16 years of age.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3123 (West 1983) (amended by Act 10). The law defined
"deviate sexual intercourse" as "sexual intercourse per os or per anus between human beings
who are not husband and wife and any form of sexual intercourse with an animal." 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Supp. 1995) (amended by Act 10).
29. Voluntary deviate sexual intercourse, a misdemeanor of the second degree, consisted
of engaging in "deviate sexual intercourse under circumstances not covered by section 3123
of this title (related to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse)." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3124 (West 1983) (amended by Act 10).
30. Aggravated indecent assault was a felony of the second degree which legislators
described as "penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of another with a part of
the actor's body for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement
procedures" under six specific scenarios listed in this provision. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3125 (Supp. 1995) (amended by Act 10).
31. Indecent assault was a misdemeanor of the second degree that essentially entailed
"indecent contact" which is touching of intimate parts for the purpose of arousing or
gratifying sexual desire. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (Supp. 1995) (amended by Act
10).
32. Spousal sexual assault mirrored the crimes of rape and involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse, but additionally required that the act be reported to a law enforcement agency
within ninety days of the commission of the offense. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3128 (Supp.
1995) (repealed by Act 10).
33. The provision for statutory rape stated the following: "A person who is 18 years of
age or older commits statutory rape, a felony of the second degree, when he engages in
sexual intercourse with another person not his spouse who is less than 14 years of age." 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122 (Supp. 1995) (repealed by Act 10).
34. See generally Mark Soifer, Revision of the Law of Sex Crimes in Pennsylvania and
New Jersey, 78 DICK. L. REV. 73 (1973) (discussing the 1972 revisions in light of the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code as compared to New Jersey sex crimes).
35. Commw. v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
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Pennsylvania's sexual offenses code once again in 1995, culminating
with the passage of Act 10.
III. Impetus to Draft Act 10
A number of deficiencies existed in the 1972 revisions which
encouraged legislators to pass Act 10 in 1995. The Pennsylvania
courts' interpretation of the ambiguities of Section 3121 led to
antithetical results. Prosecutors were also reluctant to bring Section
3121 cases to trial for fear that juries would not convict.3 6 More
importantly, although the legislature clearly indicated that resis-
tance was not required,37 subsequent court decisions interpreting
ambiguous elements of the 1972 revisions effectively removed this
protection. As a result, many groups rallied for an overhaul of the
sexual offenses code because the 1972 revisions no longer mirrored
society's attitudes and thoughts on rape. 8
The first ambiguity in the 1972 revisions was the meaning of
"forcible compulsion." 39 Under subsection (1) of Section 3121, a
form of rape was recognized when an individual engages in sexual
intercourse with another person not his spouse by forcible compul-
sion.' Because forcible compulsion was not defined in the
statute, the only guidance courts had was the legislature's passage
of the resistance-not-required statute which mandated that the
definition of forcible compulsion could not require a victim to
resist.41 Although Pennsylvania courts attempted to balance the
rights of defendants and victims when defining forcible compulsion,
these interpretations became obstacles which frustrated attempts to
prosecute rapes successfully.
36. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
37. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (West 1983). See supra note 26 and accompanying
text.
38. House Judiciary Committee Hearing Re: H.B. 160, Sept. 1, 1993. State Rep. Karen
Ritter remarked the following:
It has been 20 years since we last comprehensively reviewed these laws. In that
time, we have learned a great deal about the nature of sexual assault and abuse.
So, it is certainly time that we update our laws-to bring them in line with the
things we know and understand about the nature of these crimes.
Id.
39. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995) (amended by Act 10). See supra note
24 and accompanying text.
40. Id.
41. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (West 1983). See supra note 26 and accompanying
text.
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In Commonwealth v. Mlinarich,42  an evenly divided
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that forcible compulsion
included both physical force as well as psychological duress.
43
However, when applying this principle to the facts of the case, the
outcome of Mlinarich seemed to contravene this principle. The
victim was a fourteen-year-old girl who had previously been
committed to a juvenile detention home but was released to the
custody of the defendant's wife.' The defendant made sexual
passes at the victim over a number of months, culminating in the
defendant ordering the victim to undress completely.45 When the
victim refused, the defendant threatened to send her back to the
juvenile detention facility if she did not comply.' The victim still
refused and the defendant ordered her once more to undress
completely. As the victim screamed, hollered47 and cried, the
defendant attempted to penetrate the victim.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that these facts did not
satisfy either the forcible compulsion or threat of forcible compul-
sion criterion of rape.48 The court reasoned that there was a
difference between assault upon the will and forcing a victim to
make a repugnant choice.49  The fourteen-year-old child in
question was given a choice; therefore, forcible compulsion did not
exist.5" As Justice Ralph Larsen noted in his dissent, although the
court recognized the historical downfall of requiring the victim to
resist, it upheld that same notion by requiring the victim to
withstand a prescribed level of compulsion before the rape
occurred.51 Thus, Mlinarich focused on the victim's behavior,
42. 518 Pa. 247, 542 A.2d 1335 (1988).
43. Id. at 251, 542 A.2d at 1337.
44. Id. at 250, 542 A.2d at 1337.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Mlinarich, 518 Pa. at 250, 542 A.2d at 1337.
48. Id. at 260, 542 A.2d at 1342. The court also noted that this conduct would fail to
establish the offense of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. Id. at 260 n.7, 542 A.2d at
1342 n.7.
49. Id. at 259, 542 A.2d at 1341.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 263, 542 A.2d at 1343. Larsen issued a stinging analysis of the majority's
holding which is characterized by the following passage:
Has civilization fallen so far, have our values become so distorted and misplaced,
as to leave a fourteen year old child without protection when she is forced to
make such an awful "choice"? Thus does the criminal "justice" system, once
again, place the blame of sexual abuse upon the victim of that abuse. Thus does
the criminal "justice" system take a giant step backward towards the universally
[Vol. 101:1
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instead of the assailant's actions, in determining whether a rape
actually occurred. 2
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz," another controversial and
highly publicized opinion, became a major impetus to rape reform
in Pennsylvania. In Berkowitz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed the Superior Court's reversal of a rape conviction when it
was undisputed that the victim continued to say "no" during the
interaction.54 The defendant claimed that he understood these
protests to be thinly veiled acts of encouragement. The court
held that even though the victim repeatedly said "no" throughout
her attack, the assailant's act of non-forcible, non-consensual sex
did not rise to the level of rape because forcible compulsion or
threat of forcible compulsion did not exist.56
Rape advocates such as the Pennsylvania Coalition Against
Rape believed that this holding sent a dangerous message to rape
victims because "[w]e've been educating people and the police have
been educating people not to resist so you don't face grievous
bodily injury ... Now the Supreme Court ruling appears to say
you're going to ... have to fight to the utmost .... That's what's
so dangerous."57  As a result of Berkowitz, some prosecutors
dropped cases which they would otherwise have brought. 8
condemned state of the law where the rape victim was put on trial and blamed for
seducing her assailant by "asking for it" and by not putting up enough resistance.
Id. (Larsen, J., dissenting).
52. Mlinarich, 518 Pa. at 266, 542 A.2d at 1345.
53. 537 Pa. 143, 641 A.2d 1161 (1994).
54. Id.; see also Commw. v. Berkowitz, 415 Pa. Super. 505, 609 A.2d 1338 (1992).
55. Berkowitz, 415 Pa. Super. at 511, 609 A.2d at 1341.
56. Berkowitz, 537 Pa. at 149,641 A.2d at 1164; Berkowitz, 415 Pa. Super. at 523-24, 609
A.2d at 1347. See generally Cheryl Siskin, Criminal Law-No. The "Resistance Not
Required" Statute and "Rape Shield Law" May Not Be Enough, 66 TEMP. L.Q. 531 (1993)
(giving a more detailed analysis of the Berkowitz decision as compared to the resistance-not-
required statute and the rape shield law).
57. Emilie Lounsberry, Court: 'No' is Not Enough in Rape Cases, PHILA. INQUIRER,
June 2, 1994, at Al. See also No Quick Fixes: The High Court's Proper Ruling in Date-Rape
Case Underlines the Need for an Overhaul of PA Law, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 5, 1994, at
A10 (advocating the need for a comprehensive overhaul in Pennsylvania's rape codes);
Megan O'Matz, Lawmakers Pledge Rape Law Change, MORNING CALL (Harrisburg), June
7, 1994, at Al (quoting Kathryn Geller Myers, communications specialist for the
Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape: "The Supreme Court, while not actually stating these
words, has contributed to the myth that a rape victim must not only prove she was raped but
explain why she 'allowed' herself to be raped.. . . Once again, her actions are questioned.").
58. See Jeffrey Bair, Rape Case Dropped; Woman Just Said No, PHILA. INQUIRER, July
26, 1994, at B3 (describing how a McKean County prosecutor dropped a rape charge against
a Salvation Army official who was accused of using the weight of his body to force the
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Another ambiguity created by the 1972 revision was the third
form of rape recognized in the statute. 9 It was unclear what
legislators intended by the use of the word "unconscious," because
they failed to provide a definition of the term within the statute.
A victim who was raped while "passed out" from the influence of
alcohol or drugs would not necessarily be unconscious for the
purposes of Section 3121(3). The only cases interpreting the word
"unconscious" established that a sleeping person is deemed to be
unconscious.' A person who is severely impaired by alcohol or
drugs may not be completely asleep or unaware of her surround-
ings. Under the 1972 revisions, an attacker who clearly knows that
the victim is unaware that intercourse is occurring would not per se
have committed the crime of rape because of this ambiguity. The
statute did not clearly establish that the act of having sex with a
partner who is unaware that intercourse is occurring is a crime,
because the provision focuses on the victim's physical state and not
on the defendant's knowledge.
The above examples are only a few of the problems that
resulted from the ambiguous language and formation of the rape
statute. This construction encouraged courts to give the statute a
meaning of its own. As shown above, these interpretations
effectively brought back the requirement of resistance on behalf of
the victim even though the legislature had explicitly abolished this
requirement. By the early 1990s, it was evident that Pennsylvania
courts' interpretations of Section 3121 did not conform to societal
conceptions about the crime of rape. As a result of this dissatisfac-
tion, the legislature overhauled Pennsylvania's sexual offenses code.
IV. Legislative History of Act 10
For about ten years, the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape
(PCAR) recognized the deficiencies in the 1972 revisions and
woman to perform oral sex on him and saying the case was invalid because the woman
protested only with words and did not fight back); Claude Lewis, When Does the Word No
Mean Yes? In Rape Cases In Pennsylvania, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 27, 1994, at A9
(presenting the view that even if an aggressive man does not take a woman seriously, the law
should).
59. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995) (amended by Act 10). See supra text
accompanying note 24.
60. See Commw. v. Widmer, 446 Pa. Super. 408, 667 A.2d 215 (1995) (holding that
"unconscious" as used in the rape statute includes a victim who is sleeping at the time
intercourse occurs); Commw. v. Price, 420 Pa. Super. 256, 616 A.2d 681 (1992) (holding that
a sleeping person is unconscious for the purposes of a § 3121(3) rape).
[Vol. 101:1
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worked on a bill to redefine sexual offenses.6  State
Representative Karen Ritter (D., Lehigh) examined PCAR's
research on rape laws in other states, communicated with prosecu-
tors and law enforcement officials, and proposed House Bill 2302
in January of 1992 in the 1991-92 session.62 After this original bill
did not pass, Ritter researched the issue further and made
substantial changes so that another bill could be introduced in the
next session.63 By the 1993-94 session, the Berkowitz case had
been decided and public discontent over the holding gave Ritter's
efforts support in the legislature.'
Also in response to Berkowitz, in June of 1994 Senator Stewart
J. Greenleaf (R., Montgomery) introduced legislation attempting to
cure the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of
forcible compulsion.65 The Senate unanimously approved the
legislation, but the House chose to replace Senator Greenleaf's bill
with the more comprehensive House Bill 16066 that Ritter had
proposed in the 1993 Session.67  Greenleaf, Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, refused to support Ritter's bill,
claiming that House Bill 160 did not address the "no is not
enough" ruling of Berkowitz.6' Unfortunately, the bill died
because the Senate failed to act on the proposal before it re-
cessed.6 9
61. See supra note 10.
62. See id.; Rich Lewis, Sex-Crimes Law Overhaul Unveiled by Legislator, PA. L.J., Sept.
21, 1992, at 6.
63. Supra note 10.
64. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
65. See Robert Moran, Bill Would Make It Enough to Say No, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct.
6, 1994, at B5 (describing Greenleaf's less comprehensive approach which proposed striking
the words "forcible compulsion" from the rape statute and adding the phrase "without
consent of the other person.").
66. H.B. 160, Session of 1993, P.N. 4317.
67. O'Matz, supra note 57, at A5 (quoting Ritter: "I think what we need to do is address
some of the other deficiencies in the law as well and look at it in a more comprehensive way.
I'm concerned that a quick fix to this situation may well result in muddying the waters even
more.").
68. Megan O'Matz, Date Rape Bill Dies in Senate, MORNING CALL (Harrisburg), Nov.
22, 1994, at A1-A2 (quoting Greenleaf: "The worst part of the legislation is that it doesn't
deal with the Berkowitz decision .... So, for the most serious sexual assault, you still have
to get beat up.").
69. Megan O'Matz, Group Rips Lawmakers for Thwarting Rape Bill, MORNING CALL
(Harrisburg), Nov. 24, 1994, at A7 (describing the reactions of the PCAR to the bill-stalling
of the legislature: "Senate and House leaders who had the ability to move this legislation
were willing to kill it in order to advance other bills, indicating that the crime issue-and
women's issues in particular-are not a top priority among lawmakers.").
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Even though Ritter had retired from the House, her bill once
again came to the forefront during the 1995 Special Session on
Crime7" when Senator Greenleaf presented a comprehensive bill
revising Pennsylvania's sexual offenses.71 This bill closely resem-
bled House Bill 320 from the 1994 session. After some debate
between the Senate and House over a few key provisions, Act 10
finally passed.73 Act 10 was signed by Governor Ridge on March
31, 1995 and enacted at the end of May 1995. 7'
V. Major Changes Brought By Act 10
Act 10 implements several major changes that have the
potential of making the prosecution of sexual offenses more
successful. By examining Act 10 in light of New Jersey's sexual
75assault statute, which is similar to key provisions of Act 10 and
was one of the statutes after which Act 10 was modeled, the true
effectiveness of Act 10 provisions can be gauged. Moreover, by
analyzing these changes in light of past judicial decisions in
Pennsylvania, it is recognized that Act 10 also has the potential of
revisiting the same problems which it sought to remedy.
70. See Hank Grezlak, Marino Steers Ridge's Crime-Fighting Plan, 18 PA. L. WKLY. 210
(1995) (describing the criminal legislation part of the Special Session on Crime).
71. Although Ritter was no longer a member of the House, she continued her efforts
by volunteering her time to lobby this bill through the legislature in the 1995 Special Session
on Crime.
72. See Commw. of Pa., S. LEGIS. J., No. 4, Jan. 31, 1995, First Special Session, at 24.
Senator Mellow gave credit to Karen Ritter's efforts to pass these measures in another
session:
But I think it is also important, Mr. President, that we do realize that this
particular bill encompasses just about everything that was in House Bill No. 160
in the Session of 1993-94 that was sponsored by Representative Karen Ritter,
which passed the House of Representatives late last year. . . . So we are
considering a proposal here this afternoon, Mr. President, that actually we could
have passed in November of 1994, but nevertheless, it is important that we do pass
this as the first major piece of legislation in the Special Session.
Id. See also Karen Ritter, Press Release (Mar. 20, 1995) ("I want to set the record straight,
however: this is not, and never has been, Sen. Greenleaf's bill .... [T]he major reason why
Greenleaf now supports a bill he described as 'flawed' several months ago, is that the
'flawed' bill now has his name on it instead of mine.").
73. Commw. of Pa., HOUSE LEGIS. J., No. 25, Mar. 21, 1995, First Special Session of
1995, at 232.
74. 1995, Mar. 31, P.L. 985, No. 10 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), § 10, effective in 60 days.
75. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
1996] PENNSYLVANIA'S ACT 10: REMEDYING OR REVISITING 215
A. Political Correctness or Substantive Change?
Act 10 replaces gender specific with gender neutral termi-
nology and replaces the word "alleged victim" with "complainant"
throughout the sexual offenses code.76  In this day of political
correctness, attempts to change terminology are often met with
criticism.77 However, changing language is an important way to
begin challenging traditional myths which infiltrate the prosecution
of sexual offenses. By making these changes, Act 10 may help
affect attitudes within the judicial system as well as in society.
By using the words "he" and "actor" throughout the entire
crimes code, the 1972 revisions created a presumption that sexual
offenses are committed only by males against females. Although
statistics may show that this is predominantly the case,78 gender
specific language does not acknowledge the existence of sexual
offenses against males, or sexual crimes committed by females. By
making the code gender neutral, Act 10 recognizes these non-
traditional sexual offenses and removes the emphasis on the gender
of the victim or assailant in favor of focusing on the underlying
violent act.
Although a defendant must and should be viewed as innocent
until proven guilty, by referring to victims who had crimes
committed against them as "alleged victims," the 1972 Code
contributed to the practice of casting doubt on complaints. One of
the reasons why sexual offenses are frequently unreported is that
rape victims' fear no one will believe that a rape actually oc-
curred.79 If victims bring their complaints to the judicial system,
they often suffer yet another traumatic experience of having their
complaint viewed skeptically by the judicial system.'0  This
skepticism invalidates their feelings and validates the violent act
committed against them.
By replacing the words "alleged victim" with "complainant"
the legislature has indicated that it wishes rape victims to be
76. The definition section of the crimes code now defines "complainant" as "[a]n alleged
victim of a crime under this chapter." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Supp. 1996).
77. See We are Strait-Jacketed by Political Correctness, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro,
N.C.), July 9, 1994, at A8 (editorializing about the effects of political correctness in our
culture and how this trend discourages people from listening).
78. See supra note 2.
79. Estrich, supra note 7, at 1173.
80. Id.
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treated with the same degree of neutrality as any other crime
victim. More importantly, this change takes the burden off of
victims to prove their innocence. This change in attitude, manifest-
ed by a change in language, provides a measure of support for
victims and may help to minimize the traumatic effect of coming
forth with an allegation of rape in the judicial system.
B. Definition of Forcible Compulsion
Act 10 amends the definition section of the sexual offense code
to define forcible compulsion as "compulsion by use of physical,
intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological force, either express
or implied. The term includes, but is not limited to, compulsion
resulting in another person's death, whether the death occurred
before, during or after sexual intercourse."'', By adopting this
definition, legislators have utilized the definition which courts have
developed throughout case law.8
By ratifying the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's definition of
forcible compulsion, the legislature has opted for a narrow
approach to the crime of rape which places less emphasis on
consent. In State Ex Rel. M. TS.,83 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey recognized that physical force, which is equivalent to
Pennsylvania's forcible compulsion requirement, is the physical
force required for penetration in the absence of consent. 4  In
other words, "to convict under [this statute], the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that there was sexual penetration and
that it was accomplished without the affirmative and freely-given
permission of the [complainant]., 85 Likewise, "the law places no
burden on the [complainant] to have expressed non-consent.,
86
The role of the trier of fact is to determine whether the defendant's
belief that the complainant had freely given affirmative permission
was reasonable.87  By defining force as an absence of consent,
New Jersey eliminates the notion that an assault occurs only if the
victim's will is overcome and guards against focusing on the
81. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Supp. 1996).
82. See Commw. v. Berkowitz, 537 Pa. 143,641 A.2d 1161 (1994); Commw. v. Mlinarich,
518 Pa. 247, 542 A.2d 1335 (1988); Commw. v. Rhodes, 510 Pa. 537, 510 A.2d 1217 (1986).
83. 129 N.J. 422, 609 A.2d 1266 (1992).
84. Id.
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resistance of the victim."8 Thus, in New Jersey, "no means no"
and the failure to follow this principle is a criminal act.
Adopting this type of definition of "forcible compulsion"
would solve the problem in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz,89 which
held that non-forcible, non-consensual sex is not a form of rape.90
Even if Pennsylvania's legislators did not wish to expand the
definition of forcible compulsion to be as broad as New Jersey's
definition, they missed an opportunity to clearly define how to
interpret the term "forcible compulsion" when passing Act 10.
Thus, under the current definition of forcible compulsion, courts
remain free to adopt the same reasoning that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court adopted in Commonwealth v. Mlinarich,91 which
held that threats to a fourteen year old were not forcible compul-
sion because the victim had a choice of either sleeping with her
foster parent or being recommitted to a juvenile detention
facility.
9 2
Although the legislature's definition of forcible compulsion
may not end litigation over issues of consent, the second sentence
of the statute expands forcible compulsion to encompass rapes
which occur during the commission of a murder. By defining
forcible compulsion to encompass an act resulting in death, whether
that act occurred, before, during or after sexual intercourse,93 Act
10 overturns the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding that raping
a victim after death merely constitutes a misdemeanor of the
second degree for abuse of corpse. 94  For example, in
Commonwealth v. Sudler,95 an eighty-year-old woman was found
in her bedroom with her throat slashed and with lacerations to her
hands, face and chest.96  Subsequent medical examinations
revealed the presence of sperm in the victim's vagina.97 The
88. M.T.S., 129 N.J. at 449, 609 A.2d at 1279.
89. 537 Pa. 143, 641 A.2d 1161 (1994). See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
90. Id.
91. 518 Pa. 247, 542 A.2d 1335 (1988). See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
94. The provision for abuse of corpse is as follows: "Except as authorized by law, a
person who treats a corpse in a way that he knows would outrage ordinary family
sensibilities commits a misdemeanor of the second degree." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5510 (West 1983).
95. 496 Pa. 295, 436 A.2d 1376 (1981).
96. Id. at 299, 436 A.2d at 1377.
97. Id.
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defendant admitted to the police that he had killed the victim and
evidence was found in his apartment to support his confession.98
In reversing the defendant's rape conviction, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the legislature intended the crime of rape
to encompass indignities to the living and that there was no
evidence to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that
penetration occurred before the killing.99
As Sudler indicates, the 1972 revisions required prosecutors to
present evidence demonstrating the victim was raped before death
as an essential element of the crime of rape."° This task was
difficult because in most cases the only individuals who knew for
certain when the victim was raped were the defendant and the
deceased victim. Because prosecutors could not obtain rape
convictions in these situations, they were precluded from securing
a death penalty sentence under the aggravating circumstances
available for felony murder even though these crimes were
heinous. 1
Act 10 corrects this loophole by defining forcible compulsion
to include "compulsion resulting in another person's death, whether
the death occurred before, during or after sexual intercourse."102
Under Act 10, if a defendant rapes a victim before, during or after
death, that defendant commits a felony.0 3 Prosecutors no longer
have to perform the difficult task of ascertaining at what point in
the perpetration of the crime the victim died." Because of this
change, raping a victim will constitute a per se aggravating
circumstance under the sentencing guidelines and will allow
prosecutors to pursue a death penalty sentence for this type of
crime.105
98. Id. at 300, 436 A.2d at 1378.
99. Id. at 303, 436 A.2d at 1380-81. Accord Commw. v. Holcomb, 508 Pa. 425, 498 A.2d
833 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1150 (1986).
100. Sudler, 496 Pa. at 303, 436 A.2d at 1380.
101. During a sentencing procedure, one aggravating circumstance is evidence that "[tihe
defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony." 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9711 (Supp. 1996). Under the 1972 revisions, an aggravating circumstance would not
exist because raping a victim after death was a misdemeanor and not a felony. Conse-
quently, the death penalty would not be imposed unless another aggravating circumstances
existed. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101-3107 (1973). (repealed by Act 10).
102. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Supp. 1996).
103. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 Supp. (1996).
104. Id.
105. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(6).
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C. Section 3121 Changes
In addition to changing the definition of forcible compulsion,
Act 10 changes the definition of rape in Section 3121 in several
ways. The amended version now reads as follows:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he or she
engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant:
(1) By forcible compulsion;
(2) By threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent
resistance by a person of reasonable resolution;
(3) Who is unconscious or when the person knows that the
complainant is unaware that the sexual intercourse is
occurring;
(4) Where the person has substantially impaired the
complainant's power to appraise or control his or her
conduct by administering or employing, without the
knowledge of the complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other
means for the purpose of preventing resistance;
(5) Who suffers from a mental disability which renders the
complainant incapable of consent;
(6) Who is less than 13 years of age.°6
The additions of subsections (3), (4), and (5) have also been
applied to the crimes of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,t
aggravated indecent assault,"~ and indecent assault.1"
In the first sentence of the definition of rape, Act 10 excludes
the previous requirement that rape can only be committed "against
another person not his spouse."'1 °  Therefore, the Act brings
marital rape under the major umbrella of Section 3121. Prior to
1984, the law said that a woman could not be raped by her
spouse."' Since that time, spousal sexual assault was recognized
as a crime, but had clearly been demarcated as a separate and
106. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1996).
107. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3123 (Supp. 1996).
108. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3125 (Supp. 1996).
109. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (Supp. 1996).
110. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (amended by Act 10). See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
111. See supra note 10. See also Rene Augustine, Marriage: The Safe Haven For Rapists,
29 J. FAM. L. 559 (1990/1991) (describing how in many states in 1990, a rapist who rapes a
spouse is immune from prosecution).
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distinct offense under the 1972 crimes code.' 12 The 1972 revisions
treated a rapist who committed the underlying offense against a
spouse differently from a rapist who victimized a complete stranger.
Irrespective of aggravating circumstances, such as the use of a
weapon or infliction of a serious bodily injury, the act of raping a
spouse was considered spousal sexual assault; a second degree
felony.113 Thus, raping a spouse was a lesser crime than raping
a complete stranger."4 Under Act 10, rapists who victimize their
spouses are treated identically to other rapists.'15 Marital rape is
not considered a less serious crime than any other type of rape."1
6
In addition to abolishing the distinction between rape and
spousal sexual assault, the revised Section 3121 also cures the
ambiguity created by the legislature's use of the term "uncon-
scious" in the 1972 revisions."7 In subsections (3), (4) and (5),
Act 10 addresses a broader spectrum of scenarios where consent to
sexual intercourse is not present; where the complainant is
unaware, has been drugged or suffers from a mental disability
which renders the complainant incapable of consent."8  Now,
instead of examining solely whether the victim was unconscious, a
court must also determine whether the defendant knew that the
complainant was unaware that the sexual intercourse was occur-
ring.
119
In interpreting subsection (3), courts will have to determine
whether a subjective or objective standard will apply. The statute
is unclear whether a prosecutor must show that the defendant knew
the complainant was unaware, or whether a reasonable person in
the defendant's position would have had this knowledge. The plain
language of subsection (3) appears to suggest a subjective standard;
112. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3128 (repealed by Act 10). See supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
113. See supra note 10.
114. Id.
115. 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995).
116. See generally Emily R. Brown, Changing the Marital Rape Exemption: I Am Chattel
(?!); Hear Me Roar, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 657 (1995) (describing the change in marital
rape attitudes in several jurisdictions); Anne L. Buckborough, Family Law: Recent Develop-
ments in the Law of Marital Rape, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343 (1990) (setting out marital
rape exemptions from a number of states and recognizing that the underlying principle of
these laws is implied consent).
117. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(3) (Supp. 1995). See supra notes 59-60 and
accompanying text.
118. See supra text accompanying note 106.
119. Id.
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requiring prosecutors to prove what a particular defendant knew
and not what a reasonable person would know in the same
circumstances. 12°  This requirement would make prosecution
difficult in cases where the victim was unaware and no other
testimony was available except that of the defendant. Under a
subjective standard, even if a prosecutor shows that any person
would have clearly known the victim was unaware, the defendant
would only have to plead ignorance to assert a defense.
This problem could have been avoided by modeling the
language of this provision after New Jersey's statute which uses the
words "knew or should have known" to clearly adopt an objective
mens rea standard. 21 Under this objective standard, a jury
determines what a reasonable person would have known in the
same circumstances; the jury does not have to attempt to read the
mind of the defendant. Although Act 10 does not replicate the
words of the New Jersey statute, adopting an objective standard
would avoid the problem of determining the mindset of the
defendant. Use of an objective standard would effectuate the
legislature's intent of criminalizing sex with someone who is
incapable of consent. More importantly, an objective standard
would hold persons accountable to the mens rea which is present
in many other crimes and would strike a balance between the
competing rights of victims and defendants.
D. Sexual Offenses Against Minors
Act 10 repeals Section 3122, the statutory rape provision, and
creates the crime of statutory sexual assault. The new provision
states:
Except as provided in section 3121 (relating to rape), a person
commits a felony of the second degree when that person
engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant under the age
of 16 years and that person is four or more years older than the
complainant and the complainant and the person are not
married to each other.
122
120. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(3) (Supp. 1995).
121. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(a)(5)(b) (West 1995) ("The victim is one whom the
actor knew or should have known was physically helpless, mentally defective or mentally
incapacitated.") (emphasis added).
122. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122.1 (Supp. 1996).
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The crime is still graded as a second-degree felony."2 The 1972
revisions provided that alleged victims under fourteen years of age
and perpetrators eighteen years or older were subject to the statute;
thus, children ages fourteen and fifteen were not protected;124
The major difference with the new provision is the inclusion of
complainants under the age of sixteen where the assailant is four
or more years older, thus protecting fourteen and fifteen-year-old
minors."2 Under the new statute, perpetrators under the age of
eighteen are also subject to prosecution. 26
The most relevant change in this specific provision is the
requirement that the assailant must be four or more years older
than the complainant. 12' A recent study by the Alan Guttmacher
Institute indicates that at least half of the babies born to teenage
girls are fathered by adults."2 Out of 10,000 mothers surveyed
between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine, half of the fathers of
babies born to mothers between the ages of fifteen and seventeen
were twenty years of age or older.129 Approximately 20% of the
fathers were six or more years older than the mother.30 In
general, the younger the age of a mother, the greater the age
difference with her partner.'31
Although teenage pregnancy and sexual assault may seem to
be unrelated subjects, three-quarters of girls who have sex before
they are fourteen say they were coerced. 3 2 The two problems
are more intertwined than they first appear. Pennsylvania's new
statutory sexual assault law takes the first step in making older
partners take responsibility for entering into a sexual relationship
with a teenager who is on a much different emotional level than
someone four or more years older than her. Today, teens are
123. Id.





128. Jennifer Steinhauer, Study Cites Adult Males for Most Teen-age Births, N.Y. TIMES,




132. Ellen Goodman, But Irresponsible Fathers Have Put Many Teenage Girls on Welfare,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 24, 1995, at A27 (challenging the theory that if government denies
cash benefits to a minor mother, it will give her an economic reason to say no to sex).
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making decisions about their sexual autonomy earlier, and in recent
years states have reexamined statutory sexual assault laws because
of their protectionist attitudes toward young girls.
1 33
Pennsylvania's Act 10 strikes an appropriate balance by focusing on
age instead of gender and recognizing the coercive nature of many
of these relationships by forcing adult partners to take responsi-
bility for their sexual acts with minors.
134
In addition to creating the crime of statutory sexual assault,
Pennsylvania has made some important determinations about when
a minor can engage in consensual sex. Under the 1972 rape law,
there was no explicit age of consent within each crime to aid in
determining whether a child consented to sexual intercourse.135
In order to prosecute a defendant who had sex with a child for
rape or any other sexual offense, prosecutors had to establish each
underlying element. For example, for the crime of rape, prosecu-
tors had to prove both force and the lack of consent of the child
since performing sexual acts with young children did not establish
any crime per se other than statutory rape.136  Act 10 explicitly
includes the age of consent of thirteen for the crimes of rape,
137
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 13 aggravated indecent
assault,1 39 and indecent assault."4  Thus, any of these acts are
presumed to be non-consensual and are criminal acts if committed
against a minor who is younger than the proscribed age of
consent.14 t In addition to charging an assailant with statutory
sexual assault, prosecutors can charge assailants with the underlying
crime because performing sexual acts with a child under the age of
thirteen is per se rape.
133. See generally, Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-evaluating Modern
Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1994) (analyzing comprehensively
the complexities of statutory rape laws).
134. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122 (Supp. 1995).
135. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3128 (repealed by Act 10).
136. See, e.g., Commw. v. Poindexter, 435 Pa. Super. 509,518, 646 A.2d 1211, 1215 (1994)
(demonstrating how prosecutors would have to prove the existence of consent when an eight-
year-old child was raped and holding that "[c]ommon sense and human experience tells us
that a child of such tender years cannot and should not be expected to know and/or
appreciate the nature and implications of adult sexual relations.").
137. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1996).
138. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3123.
139. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3125.
140. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126.
141. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121.
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E. Two-Tiered Approach
The most controversial provision of Act 10 is the creation of
a two-tiered approach to sexual offenses. Under this approach,
rape is the first tier... and the newly created crime of sexual
assault is the second tier. 43 Sexual assault is a felony of the
second degree and exists when a person "engages in sexual
intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant
without the complainant's consent."'" This provision applies in
situations where any sexual activity occurs without the complain-
ant's consent and no other aggravating circumstances exist to
constitute Section 3121 rape. As evidenced by Berkowitz, this
crime would allow for a much more serious penalty than the law
had allowed in cases where lack of consent is the only issue. 45
1. What's in a Name?-Pennsylvania's new two-tiered
approach was modeled after states such as New Jersey, which
recognizes one crime of sexual assault.'" Under the New Jersey
law, the crime of sexual assault is an umbrella provision that
encompasses sexual assault"47 -non-consensual sex-and aggrava-
142. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1996). See supra part V.C.
143. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1 (Supp. 1996).
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Commw. v. Berkowitz, 537 Pa. 143, 641 A.2d 1161 (1994) (holding that the
rape conviction must be reversed and the only conviction that could stand was the indecent
assault conviction, which carried a six month to one year sentence).
146. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 1995).
147. Sexual assault is a crime of the second degree:
(b) An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual contact with
a victim who is less than 13 years old and the actor is at least 4 years older than
the victim.
(c) An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration
with another person under any one of the following circumstances:
(1) The actor uses physical force or coercion, but the victim does not sustain
severe personal injury;
(2) The victim is one whom the actor knew or should have known was
physically helpless, mentally defective or mentally incapacitated;
(3) The victim is on probation or parole, or is detained in a hospital, prison
or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over
the victim by virtue of the actor's legal, professional or occupational status;
(4) The victim is at least 16 but less than 18 years old and:
(a) The actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third
degree; or
(b) The actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim; or
(c) The actor is a foster parent, guardian, or stands in loco parentis
within the household;
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ted sexual assault,1'4 -sexual assault with other aggravating
circumstances. By designing the statute in this way, the New Jersey
legislature unified its approach to sexual offenses by recognizing
one essential underlying crime of sexual assault with many
aggravating circumstances that could increase the penalty.
In its earliest stages, Act 10 was patterned after the New
Jersey statute and adopted the terms "aggravated sexual assault"
and "sexual assault." Representative Ritter's House Bill 160
renamed the crimes of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
and aggravated indecent assault, encompassing them under the
crime of sexual assault.149 Like New Jersey, if a prosecutor could
prove the existence of aggravating circumstances, a defendant
would be charged with aggravated sexual assault, the term which
would replace the term "rape." By the final passage of the bill, the
Senate had reinstated the term "rape" and had retained the term
"sexual assault" while still maintaining the separate crimes of
(5) The victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years old and the actor is at least
4 years older than the victim.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(b)(c)(West 1995).
148. The New Jersey sexual assault statute provides that aggravated sexual assault is a
crime of the first degree:
a. An actor is guilty of aggravated sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual
penetration with another person under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The victim is less than 13 years old;
(2) The victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years old; and
(a) The actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third
degree, or
(b) The actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by
virtue of the actor's legal, professional, or occupational status, or
(c) The actor is a foster parent, a guardian, or stands in loco parentis
within the household;
(3) The act is committed during the commission, or attempted commission,
whether alone or with one or more other person, of robbery, kidnapping,
homicide, aggravated assault on another, burglary, arson or criminal escape;
(4) The actor is armed with a weapon or any object fashioned in such a
manner as to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon and
threatens by word or gesture to use the weapon or object;
(5) The actor is aided or abetted by one or more other persons and either of
the following circumstances exists:
(a) The actor uses physical force or coercion, or
(b) The victim is one whom the actor knew or should have known was
physically helpless, mentally defective or mentally incapacitated;
(6) The actor uses physical force or coercion and severe personal injury is
sustained by the victim.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(a) (West 1995).
149. H.B. 160, Session of 1993, P.N. 4317.
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involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and aggravated indecent
assault.15° The Senate reinstated the term because it felt that
abolishing the term "rape" would lessen the impact of the
crime. 1
Under Act 10, by demarcating the offenses of rape and sexual
assault as separate and distinct crimes, and by failing to eliminate
the term "rape," Pennsylvania revisits many of the traditional
approaches to rape which it sought to remedy. About half of the
states in this country have taken a progressive approach and have
abolished the term "rape" in their sexual offenses code. 52
Traditionally, rape has been viewed as a crime where a male forces
a female to submit to sexual intercourse. Jurors come to the
courtroom with this preconceived notion of rape and may be
reluctant to recognize that rape is not simply a crime of force. 53
By changing the term to "sexual assault," jurors are less likely to
have a clear definition of the term and may be more likely to
convict a defendant who performs acts that may constitute sexual
assault under law, but do not conform to their ideas of what the
term "rape" means. The use of the term "sexual assault" clearly
separates societal notions about the meaning of the term "rape"
and legal definitions of what constitutes a sexual assault.
150. Act 10 withstood an amendment by Representative Al Masland to change the names
back to rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse in the House by a vote of 75 to 126
in favor of retaining Ritter's original names. However, when the bill went to the Senate, the
names were amended and the House affirmed the amended bill. House Amendment No.
A1344, 1994-95 Session, First Special Session of 1995.
151. Id.
152. Commw. of Pa., HOUSE LEGIS. J., No. 18, Mar. 7, 1995, First Special Session, at 197.
The twenty-six states which have abolished the term "rape" in their sexual offenses code are
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming (statistics derived from the National Conference of State Legislatures, National
Victim's Center, and the National Center on Woman and Family Law).
153. See Letter from Jill Greenbaum, New Jersey Coalition Against Sexual Assault, to
the Pennsylvania Legislature (Feb. 14, 1995) (unpublished letter on file with author).
Greenbaum wrote a letter about her experience as a sexual assault counselor and advocated
the use of the term "sexual assault." This letter was sent to all House members on February
27, 1995 and used during debates on the floor:
In speaking with students, community groups and even professionals, I have
discovered a variety of definitions (and degrees of understanding) about the term
"rape." This reality indicates that many people are unclear about what this crime
means (and many people do not realize that this term may be defined differently
in each state, depending upon the definition of the statute).
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Rape counselors use the term "sexual assault" in an effort to
emphasize the term "assault" and convey the violence behind the
act.154 The term "sexual assault" recognizes the existence of non-
traditional rapes.155 Moreover, the term "involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse" implies that the act which was perpetrated
against the complainant was a deviant sexual act because the words
"involuntary" and "deviate" modify "sexual intercourse." These
words again emphasize the sexual aspect of the crime. Had the
Pennsylvania legislature used the terms "aggravated sexual assault"
and "sexual assault," a similarity between the two crimes would
have been established. However, under Act 10, the uniformity of
the crimes has been lost and sexual assault has been demarcated as
a crime separate and distinct from the crime of rape. Act 10 thus
implies that non-forcible, non-consensual sex is less severe of a
crime and not a form of rape.
Opponents to the name change claimed that by changing the
name to "aggravated sexual assault," if a witness used the term
"rape" during the course of a trial, a mistrial would have to be
declared. 56 This argument fails in two respects. First, a judge
could easily issue a jury instruction explaining how the crime of
aggravated sexual assault used to be called "rape," in order to cure
any confusion or prejudice. Second, witnesses frequently use
synonyms such as the word "killed" for "murder" or "robbed" for
"burglary," and the misuse of this terminology does not result in a
mistrial.'57
154. Id. ("In addition, labeling sexual violence as types of assaults also places these
crimes in the proper context, and by that I mean assaults of a sexual nature.") (emphasis in
original).
155. See supra note 7.
156. Commw. of Pa., HOUSE LEGIS. J., No. 18, Mar. 7, 1995, First Special Session, at 195.
157. See Letter from Robert D. Laurino, Assistant Prosecutor/Director of Essex County,
New Jersey, to State Representative Babette Josephs (Feb. 23, 1995) (on file with author).
This letter was presented to the House during argument over Rep. Masland's amendment
and explained how mistrials had not been a problem in New Jersey:
To my knowledge, the use of the term "rape" at trial has never led to a mistrial
in New Jersey, nor has it resulted in a significant issue on appeal. The mixing of
terms tends to be quite common with other criminal offenses, as in the case of the
victim of a break-in who says that he or she was "robbed" rather than "burglar-
ized." At the very most, it may be necessary for a judge in such an instance to
issue a simple corrective instruction to a jury to dispel any possible confusion or
prejudice.
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The second major argument for retaining the term "rape" was
the fear that combining rape and involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse under one category would mean that fewer crimes
could be charged and judges would be more likely to order
sentences to be served consecutively instead of concurrently.
15 8
However, nothing would prevent a defendant from being charged
with more than one count of aggravated sexual assault. Moreover,
it is always the judge's discretion whether a sentence should be
concurrent or consecutive. Even under the 1972 revisions, a judge
could decide to impose a concurrent sentence.
By refusing to recognize the traditional stigmas attached to the
term "rape," legislators have chosen to continue to allow juries to
rely on their personal biases in deciding whether the crime of rape
took place. Furthermore, by having so many different crimes with
names which no longer represent the substance of the underlying
act, Act 10 lacks the uniformity which it was so close to achieving.
Retaining the term "rape" perpetuates the recognition of more
non-traditional forms of rape and discourages victims from bringing
these crimes to the judicial system for prosecution.
2. Will "No" Mean "No?"-Although Pennsylvania has made
progress by recognizing that non-forcible, non-consensual sex is a
crime, by failing to define "consent," the legislature has enabled
courts to interpret the term in ways which may be inconsistent with
legislative intent.'59 Almost all non-traditional rapes where force
is not an issue will be prosecuted under the sexual assault provision
of the Code."6 Because non-traditional rape is an area where
opinions greatly diverge as to what is morally culpable, the need for
an explicit definition is even greater.
On the face of the statute, sexual assault requires the assailant
to engage in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse
without a complainant's consent.161 Deciding what is consensual
will be the task of the courts.62 As evidenced by the legislative
158. See Commw. of Pa., HOUSE LEGIS. J., No. 18, Mar. 7, 1995, First Special Session,
at 195.
159. See Debra S. Moffitt, New Rape Definition Already Raising New Questions,
TRIBUNE-DEMOCRAT, Sept. 9, 1994, at A5.
160. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1 (Supp. 1996).
161. Id.
162. See generally Lani Anne Remick, Read Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent
Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1103 (1993) (suggesting how a good verbal consent
statute could be drafted and giving an effective of different scenarios in which a verbal
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concern and public outcry following the Berkowitz decision,
legislative intent indicates at the very least, the desire to punish
defendants who have intercourse with a complainant who says
"no." The failure to adopt a verbal consent standard indicating
that saying "no" constitutes non-consent is inapposite to legislative
intent. Courts should not decide that if a victim says "no" she still
may be consenting, nor should they require that a victim must say
"no" more than one time." If this approach is indeed adopted
the law would once again regress to traditional times when the
focus was on the victim's subjective state of mind and when
resistance was required to establish non-consent.1" This interpre-
tation would violate the resistance-not-required statute inPennsylvania."6
A more confusing area is present in the scenario where no
words are spoken. The remaining question is whether consent or
non-consent is presumed in situations where the victim remains
silent. The courts will have to decide what facts will overcome
these presumptions without requiring that a victim resist.
In State ex rel. M. TS., the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that "permission to engage in sexual penetration must be affirma-
tive and it must be given freely, but permission may be inferred
either from acts or statements reasonably viewed in the light of the
surrounding circumstances."" Within this framework, the New
Jersey Supreme Court adopted an objective standard which focuses
on the defendant and not on the complainant. 67 Complainants
may be questioned about what they did, but only to determine
whether the defendant reasonably believed that affirmative
permission had been freely given.1" Neither the victim's subjec-
tive state of mind nor the reasonableness of the complainant's
actions are deemed relevant in determining whether a complainant
consent standard would function).
163. See Tanya Barrientos et al., The No Means No Bill Is Clear; Student Opinion Isn't
That Legislation Would Strengthen PA's Rape Laws, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 28, 1995, at B1
(citing college student reactions to new law and belief that sometimes "no" can really mean
"yes.").
164. See supra Part II.
165. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
166. State ex rel. M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 445, 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (1992).
167. Id. at 448, 609 A.2d at 1278.
168. Id. at 448, 609 A.2d at 1279.
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has consented.1 69 No inquiry is made into whether the victim
desired the act or whether the victim resisted or protested.
Based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's past decisions, it
is likely that the court will adopt a totality of circumstances test.
This is the approach the court adopted in determining whether
forcible compulsion existed. 7 ' Under this type of analysis, courts.
will make case-by-case determinations as to whether consent
existed. However, in making these determinations, courts will
identify a number of relevant factors. In light of past court
interpretations, where the supreme court essentially overlooked the
resistance-not-required statute, Pennsylvania courts could again
mistakenly interpret the consent provision. However, if judicial
interpretation is to mirror legislative intent, Pennsylvania courts
should adopt an approach similar to that of New Jersey, which
focuses on the defendant's objective reasonable belief instead of
the complainant's subjective state of mind. These important
unanswered questions will determine whether the crime of sexual
assault is a tool by which doors are opened to allow more convic-
tions in cases of non-traditional rape, whether the new law is a
prosecutor's tool for legal compromise in persuading defendants to
plead guilty to lesser offenses, or both.
VI. Conclusion
By enacting Act 10, Pennsylvania has recognized the need to
reform the judicial system to ensure victims a greater opportunity
to seek justice against their attackers. Act 10 accomplishes reform
by implementing gender neutral terminology, expanding the term
"forcible compulsion" to include sexual intercourse after death,
resolving the meaning of the term "unconscious" under Section
3121, eliminating the marital rape distinction, revising the statutory
sexual assault provision, including an age of consent in each sexual
offense, and creating the crime of sexual assault. But by refusing
to change the term "rape" to "sexual assault," the Pennsylvania
legislature has failed to take steps toward abolishing traditional
stigmas which stand as an obstacle to the prosecution of the crime
of rape. These stigmas include the recognition that "traditional"
rape is a crime while "non-traditional" rape is less of one, and
categorizing rape as an act of sex and not an act of violence.
169. Id.
170. See Commw. v. Rhodes, 510 Pa. 537, 510 A.2d 1217 (1986).
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The failure of the legislature to define key terms of the
provision leaves to the judicial system the decision of how Act 10
will affect victims in the courtroom. In order to give the Act the
legal effect which the legislature intended, the judicial system must
abandon the traditional practice of focusing on the victim's acts
versus those of the defendant. More importantly, the judicial
system should recognize that sexual offenses are crimes that are
violent assaults of a sexual nature and should treat these crimes as
any other assault would be treated within the judicial system, in
order to avoid revisiting traditional stereotypes. With this judicial
mindset, victims of sexual offenses can begin to feel comfortable
bringing their complaints to the judicial system. With these
changes, the desire of society to punish those who commit these
crimes can be effectuated.
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